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Abstract 
The combined effects of digital communication technologies, political 
upheavals around the world, waves of powerful activism and protests have injected a 
new urgency into communication research. How communication theory is able to 
respond to this challenge is a matter of discussion, including the question of the 
adequacy of older theories to the new circumstances. This paper, aims to add to this 
discussion by returning to Habermas’s pragmatics, one of the 20th century 
communication classics, to reflect on how communication and other forms of action 
interact in campaigns for social change in the context of growing reach of strategic 
communication and the growing role of  social media in activism. 
This article starts by posing theoretical disjuncture as a problem shared by a 
number of communication subfields, such as public communication, public relations, 
communication for social change, and my particular example, development 
communication. The more recent scholarship, however, has moved away from this 
state of knowledge. Instead, scholars highlight the need to embrace non-linear models, 
of communication for social change and appear to embrace hybridity to deal with the 
theoretical confusion in the field.  
The analysis presented in this article aims to demonstrate that Habermas’s 
communication pragmatics works well to explicate complex campaigning practices in 
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a consistent and yet theoretically expansive way. Re-reading Habermas makes it 
possible also to respond to the call articulated by social movement scholars to move 
beyond the limits of strategy and to recognize the importance of larger cultural 
conversations and scripts. Conceptualizing public campaigning as chains of speech 
acts, defined here as both linguistic and nonlinguistic acts, offers an analytical tool 
that works across different levels, spaces, and actors involved in social change efforts 
and that privileges communication as the explanatory mechanism for the 
contemporary social change praxis.  
Finally, returning to Habermas’s work underscores the importance a valid 
position, rather than of desirable identity, from which to engage with others in the 
social world. This invites a clear and consistent focus on action and its basis (moral 
position) rather than on attributions ascribed to organizations and campaigners 
(identity). The key question thus shifts from ‘Do you like me/trust me sufficiently 
follow me?’ to a more substantial, ‘Is this a good thing to do?’  
 
Key words: theory of communication action, social change, campaigning,  
strategic communication, development communication 
 
Introduction 
Communication and its political and social role has been studied by several 
generations of communication and media scholars (Mihelj and Stayner, 2019; 
Scannell, 2007). Yet the combined effects of digital communication technologies, 
political upheavals around the world, waves of powerful activism and protests have 
shaken up the discipline and injected a new urgency into communication research. 
How communication theory is able to respond to these changes is a matter of 
discussion, including the question of the adequacy of older theories to the new 
circumstances (Neuman, 2016). This paper, aims to add to this discussion by 
returning to Habermas’s pragmatics, one of the 20th century communication classics, 
to reflect on how communication and other forms of action interact in campaigns for 
social change in the context of growing reach of strategic communication (Hallahan et 
al, 2007) and the growing role of  social media in activism (Bennett and Segerberg, 
2012).   
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The starting premise for this discussion is that communication has social 
consequences and thus the way in which it is conducted raises questions of its effects, 
effectiveness, and ethics. This paper is organized into four sections followed by 
concluding remarks.  ‘Communication for social change: the dilemma’ introduces the 
problem pursued in this discussion: the tension between top-down and ground-up 
approaches to the use of communication in campaigning for social change. Persuasive 
and social communication practices, whether public communication, public relations, 
advocacy, strategic communication or communication for social change have had to 
grapple with the difficulty posed by Habermas’s distinction between communicative 
and strategic action: using communication to create understanding and consensus or 
employing communication to achieve desirable outcomes by engineering compliance. 
The following section, ‘Using language to act: linguistic and nonlinguistic action’ 
considers the interaction between communication and other forms of action in the 
specific context of campaigning for social change. The following two parts of the 
discussion, ‘Communicative vs strategic action’ and ‘Campaigning praxis in the light 
of speech acts’ introduce the key concepts from Habermas’s theory and then apply 
them to examples of contemporary campaigns for two reasons. Firstly, campaigns are 
reinterpreted in terms of communication rather than social movements theory. 
Secondly, an attempt is made to test the extent to which a more nuanced reading of 
Habermas’s treatment of ‘perlocution’ resonates with the reconceptualization of the 
role of communication in the field of development, and by extension communication 
for social change (Wilkins et al 2014).  
 
Communication for social change: the dilemma 
The key dilemma in the field can be summarized as the tension between two 
paradigms: persuasion versus dialogue; pre-defined goals that drive communication 
efforts in campaigning versus enabling critique and co-creation of goals; individual 
change linked to the logic of diffusion of innovations versus participation understood 
in terms of Freirean pedagogy (Tufte, 2017). 
The way in which communication as a discipline has approached the question 
of how the use of language underpins the functioning of the social world owes much 
to the philosophy of language and specifically Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action. Yet while Habermas focused on communication as the mechansim for 
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consesnus buidling that undeprins collective action, the rhetorical traditon privileges 
persuasion as the route to action. Overall, research on public campaigns tends to focus 
on three aspects: on the campaigns’ reception; on the campaign structure, process and 
its management; and finally, on the rhetorical or discursive aspect, which highlights 
specific social features of the use of language. The first, reception, treats 
communication as a stimulus that produces specific cognitive, affective, or 
behavioural outcomes and, consequently, it attempts to establish stable and 
predictable patterns in which these occur (for example, Witte, 2000). The second 
approach sees communication as a sequence of expert actions that combine: research, 
definition of the target groups, choice of message strategies, attention to channels and 
timeliness of messaging, and the evaluation of outcomes in relation to the campaign 
goals (Rice and Atkins, 2013). Finally, the third approach examines critically the 
production of texts by looking to systems of meaning and to power dynamics of 
discourse in order to explain the change sought or produced (e.g. Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989; Fairclough, 2000; Fochtner, Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2013). 
Similarly, in development communication, there is a strong focus on strategic 
approaches and persuasion as mechanisms for change and, historically there is also a 
rigid distinction between the strategic/persuasive  understanding of communication 
and the participatory, dialogical paradigm (Waisbord, 2014).  
 
This overview suggests that campaigning for social change is understood 
predominantly in terms of its ability to produce desired effects which are defined by 
the campaign goals. This technical interest in the production of persuasion and the 
resulting action can be contrasted with Habermas’s attention to the processes of 
meaning production and the lifeworld. For Habermas ‘new social movements are 
located at the intersection of system (economy, the state) and life-worlds, where they 
react to colonization tendencies’ (Lahausen, 1996: 6). In this sense, social movements 
and activism, and by extension social change campaigning, spring from a challenge to 
the existing normative order and its institutionalization (Schmidt, 2012: 104). At the 
core of what social movements do lies the need to articulate the challenge to such 
normative orders and their institutions.  
 
Such a tension between different approaches to communication can easily be 
translated into Habermasian terms. On the one hand, campaigning for social change as 
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communication seems to be understood in terms of goal orientation (strategic action), 
yet it can evade this classification as purely strategic action by the nature of its 
location in the lifeworld, resisting and challenging the established order of the system 
(communicative action). Strategic communication is often seen as disempowering 
individuals, serving to colonize the lifeworld, and consequently treated with suspicion 
(Torp, 47-48). If campaigning is largely underpinned by a social marketing model of 
targeted persuasion aimed at achieving knowledge/ attitude/ behaviour change at the 
individual level to engineer desired change, it can also be seen as explicitly concerned 
with patterns of collective behavior and mutual understanding (communicative action) 
thus directing our attention to the nature of connections and relationships enacted 
through campaigns. It is these two seemingly contradictory impulses—to create 
effective, disciplined action and to focus on critical reflection with its inherent 
freedom and resistance mechanisms (see also Sennett, 2012)—that this paper aims to 
investigate in more detail by returning to Habermas’s own theory of communicative 
action and, in particular, to his treatment of perlocution, roughly equivalent to 
persuasion, where he appears to soften the rigid conceptual boundary between 
communicative and strategic action.  
 
Using language to act: linguistic and nonlinguistic action 
The purpose of this section is to lay out my understanding of what constitutes 
action in the context of campaigning for social change, specifically to illustrate the 
distinction between action that is performed through language and forms of action that 
do not depend on language as part of their performance. Throughout the paper, 
illustrations will be drawn from real-life campaigns to sharpen up the thinking based 
on Habermas’s concepts of communicative and strategic action and on his treatment 
of perlocution. Examples used here come from three sources. Insights into Occupy 
London praxis are drawn from material accessible via the movement’s website and 
other publicly available online content at the time when the camp occupying the space 
in front of St Paul’s Cathedral was still in placei and on some of its later activities that 
encompassed the work of organizing both the people and the space. A deliberative 
event Thinking Together, A Citizens Assembly organized by So Say Scotland is used 
less extensively in this discussion but the example also utilizes online materials as 
well as the author’s knowledge as one of its facilitators. Finally, examples are also 
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drawn from the website of Anti-Slavery, a campaigning organization, established in 
1839 and dedicated to eliminating ‘all forms of slavery around the world’ 
(http://www.antislavery.org/english/what_we_do/default.aspx). 
Occupy London is part of the worldwide Occupy protest movement which 
started in New York in September 2011 in the wake of the 2008 financial crash. Its 
broad goal is to protest against the social and economic inequality that arose in a 
democratic system corroded by ‘the power of major banks and multinational 
corporations’ (Occupy Wall Street). Occupy London, part of the global Occupy 
Movement, was launched soon after New York. Its overall goal was articulated in the 
first point of the Statement the movement agreed on 26 October 2011: ‘The current 
system is unsustainable. It is undemocratic and unjust. We need alternatives; this is 
where we work towards them.’ (Occupy London Statement).  
From the minutes of the General Assembly, constituted as the main decision 
making body for the movement, dated 8 November 2011, we can identify specific 
actions undertaken by the protesters: the Finance Working Group (WG) opened a 
bank account and was ready to deal with small expense claims; Outreach WG was 
working on a leaflet; Lord Mayor’s Show WG was organizing an afternoon of 
comedy and music and looking for volunteers who could do face painting or ride a 
unicycle; and, finally, that the Sanitation WG—which was also looking for 
volunteers—announced a schedule for cleaning the site, starting at 10 o’clock from 
the Cathedral steps and then moving on to Portaloosii. 
A deliberative event such as the Citizens Assembly illustrates how talking 
about experiences and ideas, listening to others, questioning, and writing a new 
statement of shared values, thus communication itself, can constitute action. On the 
other hand, the example of Occupy London activities demonstrates how 
communication intersects with, or is auxiliary to, nonlinguistic forms of action, such 
as face painting or the cleaning of portable toilets. It also shows how non-deliberative 
forms of communication, encapsulated in texts or artifacts (e.g. leaflets or  websites) 
also constitute action. Finally, the toilet cleaning example shows that action may be 
achieved with minimal or no use of language. Moreover, such an activity constitutes 
action for social change only if it is recognized as a contribution towards creating an 
alternative to the current unjust democracy. In this case, this interpretation is derived 
from the nature and occupancy of the space, defined normatively by the explicit and 
shared stance articulated in the Statement referred to earlier. Thus, people who clean 
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the toilets are not toilet cleaners, but activists. Tempting as it is to joke here, cleaning 
the Portaloos is a rather impressive gesture of solidarity as it recognizes the presence 
and needs of other people in the most selfless and direct way, by undertaking tasks we 
do unpaid usually only when caring for people closest to us.  
While the focus so far has been to illustrate linguistic and nonlinguistic action, 
the examples have been drawn from campaigns encompassing many such individual 
activities. A campaign here is consequently understood as an extended and coherent 
unit of goal-oriented action constitutive of ‘the mobilization praxis of contemporary 
social movement organizations’ (Lahusen, 1996: ix). A campaign weaves together 
‘activities and communication geared to effect…social change’ (Lahausen, 1996: x). 
Campaigns use communication to explain and popularize their goals, to mobilize 
support, and to initiate action. Communication, thus, gives a campaign its shape: it 
frames the cause, or as I have referred to it so far–the challenge; it makes its audience  
and its supporters through forms of address and communication channels used; and it 
facilitates action, which may be performed as communication or other kind of 
activities.  
Communication as action, i.e. doing things by communicating, can take 
communicative and strategic forms—that is, it can focus on achieving mutual 
understanding or on other goals, such as getting others to perform specific actions. 
Communication as action can be exemplified by commonly used campaigning tactics, 
such as: writing to Parliamentary/elected representatives or other officials, signing 
petitions, tweeting; or by collaborative work that produces statements of values or 
policy proposals that articulate the desired change. A good example of the latter is a 
deliberative event, Citizens Assembly, organized by So Say Scotlandiii in February 
2013 to produce a grassroots view of Scotland as a democratic country at the time 
when the road to the referendum on Scottish independence (which took place in 
September 2014) was cleared by the Privy Counciliv. Occupy London has supplied 
some examples of nonlinguistic action, other popular forms of nonlinguistic include: 
(non)consumption, political participation, or forms of philanthropy. The repertoire of 
nonlinguistic action thus includes: exercising consumer choice in relation to social 
relations and governance systems embedded in goods by buying locally produced 
food, or refusing to buy garments produced by child labour; by voting in elections; or 
by donating resources such as money, time or expertise and collaborating with others 
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to create, for example, infrastructure, such as water supply systems or schools to 
change people’s lives. 
From the perspective of social change praxis, thus, action might be defined by 
three characteristics attached equally to linguistic and nonlinguistic activities by those 
who perform them and those who see them being performed. Firstly, it is meaningful 
within a particular normative framework. Secondly, it makes a specific contribution to 
the achievement of explicit (and shared) goals. Thirdly, it is a gesture of solidarity 
and, at the same time, of challenge—it acknowledges the connection to others by 
virtue of performing the activity and thus also reiterates the challenge posed by the 
campaign to the existing order.  
A further theoretical conclusion to draw from this discussion is that 
communication is related to other types of action in three possible ways. Firstly, 
linguistic action is enmeshed with nonlinguistic action in routinized or scripted 
sequences (for example, the business interaction needed to open a bank account). 
Secondly, linguistic action serves to trigger further linguistic and nonlinguistic action 
in situations where alternative scripts are possible (persuading people to deliberate; to 
volunteer to ride a unicycle or clean toilets when they can choose to demonstrate their 
engagement by other means). Finally, the act of communication itself can constitute 
action (deliberating on what democratic governance should look like in Scotland).v 
This section has demonstrated that campaigns for social change consist of 
complex chains of actions/activities that may involve communication (doing things 
with language) as well as other forms of acting (that may not depend on language 
use). The purpose here was to prepare the ground for the discussion of Habermas’s 
conceptual framework for linguistic forms of action (communicative and strategic) 
before moving on to the discussion of perlocution, a concept that focuses on ways in 
which language creates effects, makes things happen.  
 
Communicative vs strategic action  
In The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), Habermas turns to the 
question of language and action by taking a pragmatic approach and building his 
theory directly on the work of two philosophers of language, J.L. Austin and John 
Searle who proposed and elaborated the theory of speech acts. I do not intend to 
present an extensive overview of Habermas’s theory but rather to offer sufficient 
 9 
explanation of some of its key aspects to allow me to concentrate on its applicability 
to social change campaign and on its implications for thinking about the interrelations 
between communication and other types of action in this specific context. 
The starting point to this brief exposition is Searle’s view that ‘speaking a 
language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour’ (Searle, 1969: 22). This 
makes it possible to place communication conceptually in the same broad category as 
other forms of behaviourvi, which I have done in the preceding section in relation to 
the constitutive elements of a campaign. The fact that behaviour is defined as ‘rule-
based’ has a number of implications, the most salient here being that rules provide the 
social connection of intelligibility between people. Speech acts are defined as 
utterances produced in accordance with such rules that perform acts such as asking a 
question, giving a command, making an assertion about things (Searle, 1969: 16-25). 
To put it simply, a speech act is an instance of the use of language that does a 
particular job. A fundamental distinction made in the speech acts theory, and one 
retained in TCA, is that between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts:  
‘Through illocutionary acts the speaker performs an action in saying 
something…. “I hereby promise you (command you, confess to you) 
that….”.[…] Through perlocutionary acts the speaker produces an effect upon 
the hearer. By carrying out a speech act he brings about something in the 
world. (Habermas, 1984: 289) 
Habermas is keen to establish and elaborate the distinction between 
communicative action—defined by its illocutionary nature and thus the orientation to 
reaching understanding—and perlocution, which is goal-directed and considered ‘a 
special class of strategic action’ (1984:293).Yet his main interest lies in exploring 
linguistic mechanisms that underlie the process of reaching understanding which, in 
turn, produces binding obligations that trigger appropriate action, for example, joining 
a protest. In his later essays (1988/2002; 1996/2002), Habermas returns to the 
question of how communication as a form of action produces effects and he develops 
the concept of perlocution in more detail thus probing the boundary between 
communicative and strategic action as well as between linguistics and nonlinguistic 
action. In order to follow the nuances of this later elaboration, a basic exposition of 
the relevant elements of the theory will now be offered. 
A key feature of TCA is the way in which it maintains sensitivity to the 
complexity of social life, i.e. to the different levels, domains and contexts of using 
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communication as action by establishing, as the starting point, the ‘threefold relation 
to the world of communicative agents’ (Habermas, 1984: 99): to the objective world; 
to the social world of ‘legitimately regulated interpersonal relations’; and the 
subjective world of personal experiences to which the speaker has privileged access 
(1984:100). All of these are contained in a speech act. These three domains give rise 
to three types of validity claims on which agreement or disagreement between 
interlocutors rests: truth, rightness, and truthfulness/sincerity. The process of reaching 
understanding in communication, thus, hinges on the acceptance or rejection of the 
validity claims contained in, or as Habermas puts it, raised by utterances.  
Let’s take the example of Occupy London’s explanation of its purpose, quoted 
above: ‘The current system is unsustainable. It is undemocratic and unjust. We need 
alternatives; this is where we work towards them.’ For the purpose of this analysis, 
let’s interpret it as a call to action. Such a speech act might take the following form:  
“We ask you to join us in creating alternatives to the unjust and 
unsustainable democracy we live in,”  
to which one may respond:  
“Yes, I will,”  
thus accepting an obligation to act. As a speech act, this is a request to join the 
movement. This utterance contains an assertion about the world (it is unjust and 
unsustainable); and it also hints at the world of personal experiencesvii which are not 
directly accessible to the hearer. The response of “Yes” can, therefore, be seen as an 
agreement with the following three questions that represent the three types of validity 
claims raised here: 
“Dou you agree that the current form of democracy is unfair and 
unsustainable?” (Truth)  
“Do you agree that it is right/appropriate for us to make this request of 
you?” (Rightness, appropriateness, i.e. normative validity)  
“Do you agree that we are sincerely concerned with the state of 
democracy?” (Truthfulness/Sincerity)   
The agreement constituted on all three aspects of validity, defines 
communicative action. Habermas offers such communicative agreement as a model of 
rationality.  
Thus, communicative action with its illocutionary orientation represents 
communicative rationality; whereas perlocution/strategic action, which is not 
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constituted by such validity claims, but is instead accepted or challenged on the basis 
of its effectiveness, is characterized as irrational. In this example, a strategic approach 
would focus on the assessment of whether joining the protest action is the most 
effective way to achieve the goal of change. We find such a strategic interpretation of 
Occupy London expressed by some of its critics who saw it as a failure—ineffective 
because of its ‘incoherent’ and unrealistic goals (i.e. ways of going about the system 
change): ‘Certainly their rhetoric at the start about sweeping changes to the financial 
sector was unrealistic and was never going to happen.’ (Cacciottolo, 2012). Those 
who supported the protest saw such strategic criteria as unimportant and instead 
interpreted the events—St Paul’s protest camp— as communicative action, as a 
successful illocutionary act constituted through collective action: 
‘It doesn't matter whether the tents are there or not, …. it doesn't matter 
if we're able to camp there. What matters is we've been able to come together 
and meet a lot of people who have all formed networks, both nationally and 
internationally, to make our voices heard against the crisis which the banks 
have created and the corporate greed.’ (Cacciottolo, 2012). 
If initially in TCA illocutionary and perlocutionary/strategic speech acts (doing 
by saying, vs. saying to get things done) are clearly separated, they soon become more 
of a tangled problem, as indicated by Habermas in his more detailed discussion of 
speech acts (1984: 284-325; Smith, 1997:108). He returns to perlocution as something 
of an unfinished business in his later essays, ‘Actions, speech acts, linguistically 
mediated interaction, and the Lifeworld’ (1988/2002) and particularly in ‘Some 
further clarifications of the concept of communicative rationality’ (1996/2002). The 
absolute demarcation between communicative and strategic action begins to lose 
some of its sharpness once a more detailed account is offered of the processes of 
reaching understanding and of perlocutionviii (Baxter, 2011: 16). On the face of it, this 
may sound a rather heretical position to take given Habermas’s repeated and explicit 
separation of communication oriented towards reaching understanding 
(communicative action) and action oriented towards consequences other than 
understanding (strategic action). Yet, I want to argue that there are grounds in 
Habermas’s own writing to work with these ideal-type constructs in a more pragmatic 
way, highlighting the complexity of social action such as campaigns for social change 
as well as acknowledging a level of openness and choice available to those who 
encounter such campaigns as to the mode of their engagement. 
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 My argument here follows Habermas’s more nuanced explanation of 
both communicative actions itself, and the way in which communication in either of 
the two forms can be “stitched to” actions that follow. Firstly, communicative action 
can now take one of two forms: strong, with all validity claims being accepted, which 
Habermas labels as agreement; or weak, where only claims of truth and 
truthfulness/sincerity are accepted–this Habermas calls understanding (Habermas, 
1996/2002: 332). Secondly, perlocution is also presented as a range, starting with 
effects that follow directly from the illocutionary achievement and ending with 
strategic action where effects are produced by systematically distorted 
communication, that is communication which not only blocks routes to consideration 
of validity claims but may also obscure the desired effect itself in order to make it 
happen (Habermas, 1976/2002: 93; 1988/2002: 222-223).  
[Type 1of] Perlocutionary effects1 result grammatically from the 
content of a successful illocutionary act—as when a valid command is 
executed, a promise is kept, a declared intention is realized, or when assertions 
and confessions consistently fit with the subsequent course of interaction. … 
[Type 2] Perlocutionary effects2 are grammatically non-regulated, that is 
contingent, consequences of a speech act that, however, occur only as a result 
of an illocutionary success—as when a piece of news, depending on the 
context, delights or startles the receiver, or when an imperative encounters 
resistance, a confession awakes doubt and so forth. Finally, perlocutionary 
effect3 [Type 3] can be achieved only in a manner that is inconspicuous as far 
as the addressee is concerned: the success of this strategic action of a kind that 
remains latent for the other party—is also dependent on the manifest success 
of an illocutionary act. (Habermas, 1996/2002: 330) 
 
There are three points to take away from this discussion. Firstly, there is more 
than one form of illocutionary success—strong and weak. In practical campaigning 
terms, the question that arises here is about the consequences of this distinction for the  
resulting action: do different forms of communicative action lead to different 
consequences? Secondly, illocution and perlocution are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive but rather co-present in different configurations. In other words, while 
understanding or agreement are entirely cut off from persuasion and actions that 
follow, perlocutionary effects (strategic action) depend on some degree of 
 13 
illocutionary success (Habermas, 1996/2002:223). Thirdly, the interrelations of 
understanding and successful persuasion may depend on the way in which 
participants engage in the communication game: the stances they adopt throughout 
interactions and the ways in which they read the actual forms of language they 
encounter, as opposed to their idealized forms on which the Habermas’s framework 
rests. The following section will examine these ideas in the context of campaigning 
for social change. 
 
Campaigning praxis in the light of speech acts 
In this section Habermas’s ideas introduced above are applied to interpret real 
life, complex examples of the interaction of communication and other forms of action 
in pursuit of social change. The first part of this section shows that campaigning for 
social change can be understood as opening of multiple simultaneous conversations 
where linguistic action triggers a range of different commitments for ensuing action 
(including rejection). The second part of this section interprets campaigns not as a 
linear development of strategic action, i.e. change that unfolds in a controlled way 
triggered by communication, but rather as multiple long chains that weave together 
communicative and strategic action as well as nonlinguistic actions that follow from 
them. 
  
Illocutionary and perlocutionary effects in campaigning 
The previous section of this paper offered a model of what a strong 
illocutionary effect might look like in the case of Occupy London. If we accept this 
model, we can view the 100 occupiers and 200 supporters present when the eviction 
of the camp took place as acting on the obligation resulting from the agreement with 
the call to protest. Communicative action thus led directly to the fulfillment of the 
accepted obligation to act. However, there is also evidence of a different illocutionary 
process at work. David Green’s New Statesman blog, An Open Letter to the St Paul’s 
Protesters (24 February 2012) writes: ‘I will be sorry to see you go. I work in the City 
of London, and I have walked past your tents most days [emphasis added]’.  He then 
goes on to say: 
‘Just by staying put you shoved those in power into uncomfortable and 
telling predicaments. …And you have been decent and polite throughout your 
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stay. The camp has applied health and safety measures which show a genuine 
care for yourselves and those who could be affected by you. There has been 
sincere and often constructive engagement on various issues with bankers, 
lawyers and other City workers. …But the great achievement of "Occupy 
LSX" was never the physical camp: It was the realisation that those in power 
can be wrong-footed, and that their bullshit can be exposed, by those who are 
serious and thoughtful about promoting a better world. This can be done 
anywhere, and not just in a churchyard of a Cathedral.’ 
We can point here to the validity claim being accepted at the levels of truth 
(agreement on the destructiveness of capitalist institution) and truthfulness (‘serious 
and thoughtful’) thus suggesting a weak form of communicative action. It is also clear 
that the writer did not join the protest. The question then is whether the link between 
accepting an obligation and following through with an appropriate action is as direct 
as Habermas assumes. Let’s this question in some more detail. 
A YouGov poll conducted on 28-29 February 2012ix offered some useful 
material: 43% of those surveyed agreed with the aims of the protest action, 
irrespective of their position on the rightness of the protest camp itself; 66% thought 
that the eviction of the camp was the right decision and 26% disagreed with the aims 
of the protest. While the first figure can be interpreted as a statistical illustration of the 
split between weak and strong communicative achievement— not all who supported 
the aims supported the methods; the latter pair of figures might suggest the extent of 
the disagreement not only on the methods appropriate for the social change sought, 
but also on the view of the world that is offered by the protesters (truth).  
Another way to approach the question of the link between campaigning as 
speech acts and actions they bring about in this example is to ask what the protest 
achieved. YouGov’s website carried some relevant data and analysis: 71% of their 
survey respondents (see above) thought the protest achieved little or nothing, while 
15% thought the opposite. Qualitative comments from this survey offer more insight 
into what is behind these numbers, i.e. how people engaged with the statement made 
by Occupy London, as well as with its ten-point Statement.x YouGov summarized 
these views as a list of statements, the negative ones being: ‘nothing has changed; 
they had a bad reputation; it was too disorganized and unclear; they alienated their 
sympathisers; they didn’t get enough good publicity, the public are “fed up” of 
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protest’xi. Interpreting them in terms of validity claims shows that validity was 
challenged at the level of truthfulness: 
‘I feel the protesters were not genuine victims of the recession but 
trained activists and troublemakers’ Rosie B, South London 
Validity was also challenged on the level of rightness, specifically by 
ascribing particular views or characteristics to the protesters that apparently made it 
illegitimate for them to protest against the system: 
‘The majority of them shown on TV looked like long haired dropouts. 
Have they not got jobs to do, and families to support, or are they living off tax 
payers like myself?’ (Lesley, South Yorkshire) 
‘Usual bunch of crusties who protest about everything. Would have 
been nice to see a cross section of people, but I guess they are all too busy 
running on the treadmill to stay in the same place’ (John B, East Sussex), 
We also see an attack on the methods, which constitutes a kind of normative 
challenge (rightness) 
‘They hardened my attitude toward this sort of lawless, anti-social 
behaviour! I'm sick of the Government, authorities and media pandering to 
such obvious law breakers! It's my hard earnt taxes they were spending!’ 
(Mike, South West.) 
Finally, there is evidence of responses to Occupy London that interpret it as a 
failed strategic action on the grounds of its ineffective methods (rather than their 
inappropriateness in the normative sense): 
‘Just wasn't handled in the right way. They came across as mad, lefty 
activists claiming to represent “the people”. Better methods could have been 
followed’ (James, London) 
‘You can't change the world with tents’ (Pete, Coventry) 
 
or on the grounds of failure to achieve stated goals: 
‘Nothing has changed. The system will still work in the same way it 
always has’ (DC, Walsall) 
A relevant example of a strategic reading of the protest comes from Don 
Hodges’ blog in Total Politics (28 October 2011). The author is presented as a 
professional (a campaigner for ‘Labour, the trade unions, private and charity sectors’) 
bewildered by the ways of the protest camp that break the cardinal rules of 
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communication management: he asks what the message is, and gets six different 
answers; the mission statement is illegible; there is no press office, and the press 
officer is rather elusive — in short, ‘pretty poor trade craft’ is his judgment. The 
failure is quite clearly attributed to the nature of the organizational form adopted— 
grassroots, open, nonhierarchical. The protesters themselves say: ‘as an organisation 
we’ve grown organically’, ‘….we’re not managed from the top down [people] tend to 
gravitate towards the things that interest them’ (Hodgson, 2011). 
What these examples show is that the speech act can elicit a range of different 
responses: the same opening gambit may lead to different simultaneous 
‘conversations’ developing, triggering chains of further action. We can see levels of 
success in communicative action; but we can also see different ways of interpreting 
the intention behind the campaign and engaging with it as a speech act: while some 
see it as oriented towards co-operation to underpin change (performative attitude); 
others read it as oriented towards achievement of stated goals (strategic) and regards 
is as a failure. In his model of how language constitutes action, Habermas offered 
great conceptual clarity, but the price for this clarity is the distance it puts between the 
theory and the messiness of the phenomenon it dissects and reassembles as disciplined 
knowledge.  
The next section aims to shorten the distance between theory and practice by 
considering campaign communication praxis not as selected specimens, such as the 
narrowly focused examples presented so far, but rather as larger and messier patterns 
of actions, or simultaneous conversations. I attempt to explore an idea whose presence 
is marked in TCA and articulated in ‘Some further clarifications of the concept of 
communicative rationality’ (1996/2002), namely that to understand human action is to 
see it as something of a patchwork, a pattern formed by the interlocking of different 
types of action. 
Social change campaigns as chains of speech acts 
Occupy London was grassroots, open, and undisciplined (in a Foucauldian 
sense) type of organization; Anti-Slavery International, on the other hand,  can be 
seen as dramatically different in its approach to organizing. First of all, it is 
institutionalized through its official status as a registered charity in the UK with its 
clear official statement of aims and of its finances. Anti-Slavery has employees, 
volunteers, offices in London, and an annual income of just under £3 million (in 
2018), nearly two thirds coming from institutional donors and earmarked for specific 
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activities.xii It operates within a network of established organizations such as the 
International Labour Organization (ILO); the International Trade Union 
Confederation, (ITUC), human rights organizations such as Liberty or Amnesty 
International; and it can obtain access to formal policy making processes, for example 
by gaining support from officials such as George Sabin Cutaş, an MEP who was the 
rapporteur in the EU parliamentary debate on EC-Uzbekistan partnership and 
cooperation agreement on bilateral trade in textiles on 14 December 2011 and made 
an explicit promise to put Anti-Slavery’s work forward for consideration in future EU 
policy making processes.xiii 
Like many international campaigning organizations, Anti-Slavery depends, on 
the one hand, on a set of activitiesxiv such as campaigns focused on specific or local 
iterations of the main issue of slavery (e.g. domestic slavery, forced and bonded 
labour, trafficking; Cotton Crimes in Uzbekistan; a Chocolate/cocoa campaign in 
Ivory Coast; a fishing industry campaign in Thailand). On the other hand, it also 
carries out more generic activities, such as fundraising, education, outreach, and 
research. To shed more light on the pattern of this organization’s overall action, it is 
useful to start with a specific campaign, such as Cotton Crimes, directed against the 
use of child and forced labour in cotton harvests by the government of Uzbekistan.  
I argue that it is possible to see this campaign as interrelated speech acts: if we 
treat Cotton Crimes as an illocutionary act of request for support, its other elements 
identified on the relevant page of the website—Background Information, Cotton 
Crimes Video, Write to MEP and Write to Daewoo—can be seen as both speech acts 
in their own right, but also as acts that follow from the initial request. For example, 
Background Information, presented in the form of an argument for why 
intervention/action is needed, can be seen as a constative type of speech act: it makes 
an assertion about the objective world, e.g. the use of children and other forced 
labour, the way that practice works, the market value of its product, and the way in 
which the government flouts its obligation to ensure fair labour practices. The links to 
research and evidence referred to at the bottom of that particular page can be seen as 
offering further support to this assertion. The short Video contains a visual 
representation of the key argument: it makes a connection between the practices of 
consumption of luxury cotton goods in the West and the injustice and force involved 
in the production of such goods. By sharing this video through social networks, which 
viewers are asked to do, another action is added to this chain: a request to inform 
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others about this state of affairs. Thus, while Background Information can be seen as 
creating the knowledge on which the claim of truth for this campaign can be settled, 
the organisation’s history (Our History) and its Annual Reports going back to 2008 
(Resources) can be seen as supporting its claim to truthfulness. The challenge on 
normative grounds (rightness) is anticipated with the abundant case study material 
across many pages of the site: people who have experienced slavery giving first-hand 
accounts, highlighting brutality, poverty, and indignity inflicted on victims of slavery. 
These are expected to contrast not only with the life experiences of many readers but, 
perhaps more importantly, with their ideas of justice and human dignity. Case studies 
typically take the form of expressive speech acts (a first-person account, the speaker 
referring to his/her own experience, the aim being that of self-representation) and the 
validity claim that settles this type of action is the truthfulness of the account: thus 
readers need only accept that this is truly the account of the person who speaks, the 
narrative ‘I’, and that the narrator is faithful to his or her experiences. 
The final example I wish to consider here is that of a common mobilization 
strategy, a letter writing campaign used in this context to put pressure on the 
addressee: the Write to Daewoo campaign. The company is singled out as the largest 
processor of Uzbek cotton. The draft letter to the company’s chairman is supplied so 
that the action requested need not involve more than supplying one’s own details and 
sending the letter. The speech act is, again, that of a request—to write to Daewoo 
obliging it ‘to pledge its opposition to the Uzbek government’s forced-labour system.’ 
This is an openly strategic act: the request rests on the expectation of a particular 
effect and on the readers’ understanding of this particular influence mechanism 
(consumer boycott; loss of custom). The website provides examples of successful 
petitions and letter writing campaigns to back up the claim of effectiveness in this 
specific case. In fact, this request is designed to trigger a two-step strategic act: that of 
putting public pressure on Daewoo, and of Daewoo, in turn, putting pressure on the 
Uzbek government.  
This is a good point at which to return to the question asked earlier about the 
assumption of a direct connection between communicative action and the ensuing 
actions undertaken to change in the world (perlocution). It seems now that a better 
question here is not whether or not accepting an obligation to act leads directly to 
action, but rather how such an obligation may be translated into predictable forms of 
action. In the examples above we have seen how the need for profound social change 
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may lead to different forms of engagement, or conversations, as I have called them, 
and how laying out a range of more specific routes to different actions such as 
occupations, or letter writing, or fundraising by participating in organized marathons 
helps to anticipate such differences in engagement and to funnel action into specific 
activities. Thus, campaigning can be understood as a complex chain of speech acts 
that include linguistic and nonlinguistic action and produce not only social change but 
also campaigning organizations themselves. In this sense, campaigning demands an 
interplay between producing understanding and producing strategic effectiveness. 
However, this is a game played simultaneously on more than one field and a game 
that is never entirely controlled by any of the interlocutors, despite professional 
campaigners’ or strategic communication experts’ wish to make us believe otherwise.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In times of rapid change in communication technology and practice, ideas 
regarded as classics in the discipline of communication can be revisited to interpret 
and understand the new developments. The key argument made in this paper is that 
despite technological and theoretical changes, Habermas’s communication pragmatics 
offers a parsimonious framework for the understanding of contemporary campaigning 
for social change, covering both communication and other forms of action repertoires.   
This article starts by posing the theoretical disjuncture as a problem shared by 
a number of communication subfields, such as public communication, public 
relations, communication for social change, and my particular example, development 
communication. The more recent scholarship, however, has moved away from this 
state of knowledge. Instead, scholars highlight the need to embrace non-linear models, 
for example of communication for social change (Ciszek, 2017, Tufte, 2016). In 
communication for development, effectively, one could argue, that scholars promote 
hybridity (see Chadwick, 2017) as a way of dealing with the theoretical confusion in 
the field (Tufte, 2016; Wilkins et al, 2014). The analysis presented in this article aims 
to demonstrate that Habermas’s communication pragmatics works well to explicate 
complex campaigning practices in a consistent and yet theoretically expansive way. 
Although this analysis is focused narrowly on understanding and perlocution as key to 
campaigning praxis, it is clear that Habermas’s thought links also to development 
communication scholars’ preoccupation with agency, justice, and empowerment.  
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Re-reading Habermas makes it possible to respond to the call articulated by 
social movement scholars to ‘move beyond the limits of strategy (understood as goal-
oriented action)’ and to recognize the importance of larger cultural conversations and 
scripts, i.e. the understandings of hidden ‘ways of doing things that become routinized 
as habits, repertoires and traditions’ (Doherty and Hayes, 2019: 281). Conceptualizing 
public campaigning as chains of speech acts, defined here as both linguistic and 
nonlinguistic acts, offers an analytical tool that works across different levels, spaces, 
and actors involved in social change efforts and that privileges communication as the 
explanatory mechanism for the contemporary social change praxis.  
Finally, at the time when concepts of identity and reputation are treated as 
central to the construction of collective, organizational voices in the public domain 
(Edwards, 2018: 10), returning to Habermas’s work underscores the importance of a 
valid position, rather than of desirable identity, from which to engage with others in 
the social world. This invites a clear and consistent focus on action and its basis 
(moral position) rather than on attributions ascribed to organizations and campaigners 
(identity/image/reputation). The key question thus shifts from ‘Do you like me/trust 
me sufficiently to follow me?’ to a more substantial, ‘Is this a good thing to do?’  
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Notes 
 
i The original camp occupied the space in front of St Paul’s Cathedral in the center of 
London. It was cleared on 28 February 2012, following the eviction order obtained by 
the City of London Corporation. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/feb/28/police-evict-st-pauls-occupy-protesters 
 
ii This information was drawn from http://occupylondon.org.uk/occupylsx-general-
assembly-minutes-8112011-7pm/ (accessed May, 2014).  
 
iii So, Say Scotland is a non-profit organization devoted to democratic reform in 
Scotland, se https://www.facebook.com/sosayscotland/. For more on Thinking 
Together, A Citizens Assembly, see 
http://issuu.com/sosayscotland/docs/sosayscotland-treasuretrove-thinkin.  
 
iv Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013 introducing an 
appropriate modification to the relevant legislation on devolution of powers between 
Scottish and the UK governments and parliaments. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20546497 
 
v This distinction brings to mind Habermas’s distinction between institutionally bound 
and institutionally unbound speech acts. The first derive their meaning from the logic 
and norms of specific social institutions, for example speech acts of christening a 
baby or of betting derive their meaning from the institution of christening or betting 
(Habermas, 1976/2002, :  60). Institutionally unbound speech acts, such as, 
‘commands, advice or questions do not represent specific institutions … and can fit 
very different institutions’ (Habermas, 1976/2002, : 61). While institutions often 
prescribe either very specific communication scripts (e.g. a marriage ceremony) or at 
least rough outlines of such scripts (obtaining advice from your doctor in the context 
of a consultation), I wish to note the existence of such scripts, for example for advice 
giving or expressing requests more generally, when their link to specific institutions 
might be rather loose. 
 
vi For stylistic reasons, I use here the term behavior but treat it as synonymous with 
action. For reasons of brevity, I do not offer further discussion of this point based on 
Weber’s differentiation between the two terms. 
 
vii For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I shall not make a distinction between 
individual and organizational speakers at this point in my argument. 
 
viii ‘“Perlocution” is, of course, the name we give to the effects of speech acts that, if 
need be, can also be brought about causally by nonlinguistic action.’ (Habermas, 
1996/2002: 329) 
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ix The survey was conducted on a sample of 1, 778 British adults (25-60+) drawn 
from across England and Scotland. 
http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/vb5ebifzi7/Copy%20of%20Result
s%20120229%20Occupy%20London.pdf 
 
ix (http://occupylondon.org.uk/about-2/) 
 
x (http://occupylondon.org.uk/about-2/) 
 
xi (http://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/02/29/occupy-london-what-impact-has-it-made/ 
xii See https://www.antislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Anti-Slavery-
Accounts-2017-18.pdf 
 
xiii See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20111214+ITEM-018+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
 
xiv Unless otherwise indicated, all the details used in the discussion of Anti-Slavery 
come from the organization’s website http://www.antislavery.org/english/ accessed 
regularly between June and October 2014. 
